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Abstract
This paper examines whether family ownership of private companies influences
financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosures. Results reveal that family
ownership impacts positively on financial reporting quality and on the likelihood of
lodging abbreviated financial reports. While family-owned private companies have
fewer incentives to provide voluntary information as they incur higher proprietary
information costs, results support the argument that financial reporting quality and
voluntary disclosure have different economic roles. Findings also suggest that lower
voluntary disclosures do not necessarily imply financial reporting quality will be
adversely affected, which has implications for policy makers and accounting
standards setters.
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Financial Reporting Quality and Voluntary Disclosures in Private Firms
1. Introduction
This paper investigates financial reporting behaviors of private medium sized family
companies in the UK, with a particular focus on the effects of ownership structure on
financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosures among private companies.
Despite the possibility that private firms may exhibit lower levels of agency costs
compared to public firms, private firms are not a homogeneous group and there is
merit in examining how differences in ownership affect the financial reporting
behavior of private firms. Accordingly, the first objective of this study is to examine
whether ownership structure, specifically family and non-family ownership structures,
affect financial reporting quality of medium sized private companies in the UK. The
second objective is to investigate whether family and non-family firms have different
preferences for voluntary disclosure.
Privately held entities constitute the majority of companies in the world
(Chen, Hope, Li and Wang, 2011). In the United Kingdom, private companies
outnumber public companies representing 99.6 per cent of all incorporated entities
(Companies House, 2009/10). Furthermore, small and medium size enterprises
(SMEs) play a major role in both developing and developed economies. SMEs
account for 95 per cent of all firms in most countries (Chiao, Yang and Yu, 2006) and
provide close to 60 per cent of manufacturing employment in a large proportion of
countries (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2007). In spite of their significant
economic influence on the economy in terms of both employment and contribution to
gross domestic product, little is known about the financial reporting practices by
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private firms (Ball and Shivakurnar, 2005) and by SMEs in particular (Ayyagari et al.,
2007).
Similarly, family ownership is a common form of ownership (Burkart,
Panunzi and Shleifer (2003). In the US, one-third of S&P (500) firms can be
classified as family controlled (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and at least half of all
private companies in the US are family businesses (FFI, 2014). According to an
Institute for Family Business Report (2011), family firms are the backbone of the UK
economy. The report reveals that in 2010 there were almost 3 million family
companies in the UK or more than three in five of all private sector enterprises. In
terms of employment, UK family businesses provided 9.2 million jobs in 2010, which
is around 50 per cent more than the entire UK public sector. Additionally, family-
owned companies generated revenue of £1.1 trillion or 35.3 per cent of total private
turnover.
Although research on family businesses in the public setting is relatively
extensive, there is limited research examining financial reporting behaviour I and
voluntary disclosures of private family and non-family companies. Private family
firms have a unique ownership structure in that their founders or descendants are
among the largest shareholders, they usually manage the firm, and they usually have a
seat on the board of directors (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003). While theory
suggests that family firms are more susceptible to entrenchment and/or expropriation
problems (i.e., Agency Problem Type II) between controlling family and other
stakeholders (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz, 2001), recent empirical
research suggests that private family firms might actually derive agency benefits
through their increased incentives to monitor firm performance and by having less
1 A recent exception is West head and Howorth (2006) who investigated private family companies and
performance and Dedman and Lennox (2009) who examined the impact of perceived competition on
voluntary disclosure of private UK companies.
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external pressures to meet short term objectives. These benefits are attributed to
private family firms being insulated to the same capital market pressures that public
companies experience and by substantial ownership closely tying firm wealth to
family wealth - factors which might affect the financial reporting behaviour of family
firms (Carney, Essen, Gedajlovic and Heugens, 2013). Notwithstanding these costs
and benefits, the literature is still unclear whether private family firms increase
agency costs due to their pursuit of non-economic goals or decrease agency costs as a
result of their incentives to maximize family wealth (Carney et aI., 2013).
Accordingly, how these agency factors will affect the financial reporting and
voluntary disclosure behaviour of private family firms is an open empirical question.
Furthermore, voluntary disclosure choices of family firms is an area where
more research is warranted (Chen, Chen and Cheng, 2008). For example, empirical
research reported by Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009) suggests that in less
transparent environments, family firms have no incentives to provide voluntary
disclosures and as a consequence these firms are more susceptible to extracting firm
resources for their own benefits. Meanwhile, Dedman and Lennox (2009) provide
evidence that managers of private companies in the UK are more likely to withhold
proprietary information if perceived or potential competition is strong. Following
these studies, we extend Anderson et al's (2009) suggestions related to family firms
and Dedman and Lennox's (2009) evidence on proprietary information, and
investigate whether ownership structure has an impact on the quality of financial
reporting as well as on the voluntary disclosure behaviours of private companies in
the UK. In this manner, we examine whether ownership structure impacts the
withholding of proprietary information in a transparent regulatory environment.
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We utilize panel data on a sample of private UK companies over the period
2004-2011. The advantages of using UK companies are availability of data due to the
regulatory environment requiring lodgement of financial reports by a wide variety of
private companies and changes to the legislation during the sample period requiring
firms to provide either full or abbreviated financial statements, making it possible to
test proprietary costs among private companies in the UK. Unlike in the US and in
other jurisdictions such as Australia where financial data of private companies is not
widely accessible (Hope, Thomas and Vyas, 2013; Carey, Potter and Tanewski,
2014), private companies in the UK are required by law to file financial statements at
Companies House (a central depository), enabling financial statements to be made
publicly available (Collis, 2012). Further, as one of the objectives of the paper is to
examine voluntary disclosure of private firms within the sample period utilized in this
paper, there is an opportunity to examine voluntary disclosure preferences of private
firms as the companies in the sample have the option to file full or abbreviated profit
and loss accounts (Dedman and Lennox, 2009).
Using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accrual quality and the
Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model as proxies for financial quality, we find
family ownership is associated with higher financial reporting quality. Further, family
ownership is only positively associated with earnings quality when ownership is more
than 50 per cent of the companies shareholdings. This result corroborates evidence on
family firms in the public firm setting such as Chen et al. (2013) and Ali et al. (2007).
A GMM specification was also utilized in this study to take into account potential
endogeneity issues in the modelling of family ownership. Overall, results observed
from this alternative specification are largely similar and family ownership remains
associated with higher financial reporting quality.
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Logistic regression models suggest that family firms are significantly and
positively associated with the likelihood of lodging abbreviated financial reports.
Consistent with predictions results suggest that family and non-family firms have
different preferences for voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the results show that
regardless of the firm's financial reporting quality, there is no significant difference as
to whether family firms submit an abbreviated or full financial report. This is similar
to the effect of family ownership observed by Ali et al. (2007), suggesting that
financial reporting quality and the decision to voluntarily disclose information are two
separate decisions. In particular, whilst voluntary disclosure is linked to proprietary
cost issues, financial reporting quality is important for stewardship as private firms do
not have market measures of firm value (Chaney et al. (2004). Moreover, it suggests
that not disclosing potentially sensitive information is not indicative of lower financial
reporting quality. This is in contrast to studies suggesting that in less transparent
environments, families have incentives for private rent extraction (Anderson et al.,
2009).
Our paper contributes to the literature on private firms, earnings quality and
voluntary disclosure in several ways. First, it provides evidence on how variation in
ownership, specifically family ownership across private medium-sized companies,
affects the quality of both earnings and voluntary disclosure practices. Although a
number of studies have examined family ownership and earnings management, this
study is one the first few to examine how family ownership affects earnings in the
private medium-sized company setting. This is important given the increasing
emphasis being placed by regulators on accounting practices of small businesses
worldwide (IASB, 2010; Carey et al. 2014). Furthermore, financial statements are
usually the only source of publicly available information on private companies.
6
Information regarding the quality of this information would help to reduce
information opacity, which is a characteristic of private firms' financial reporting
environment (Minnis, 2011).
Second, this paper takes advantage of an ideal setting to test the proprietary
cost hypothesis and contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosure. Specifically,
this paper examines the potential impact that family ownership has on the disclosure
behaviour of medium-sized private companies. Findings from this paper suggest that
financial reporting and voluntary disclosure may have different economic roles, as
family firms are associated with both better financial reporting quality and a lower
likelihood to disclose potentially commercially sensitive information such as sales
and cost of sales. Our study fills an important gap in the literature by examining the
relationship between proprietary cost theory and ownership, specifically family
ownership, on the companies' choice to disclose information on sales and cost of
sales. In particular, results suggest that family ownership is an important indicator of
voluntary disclosure. To the extent of our knowledge, this is the first study that
examines this association in the context of private companies.
Third, an understanding of how earnings quality varies with ownership
structure provides potential benefits to users of private companies' financial
statements such as investors and creditors. Our evidence is line with the view that
private companies are not a homogeneous group and different types of private
companies vary in their financial reporting behavior. Additionally, an implication for
policy makers is that, in light of the lower level of disclosures in IFRS for SMEs,
findings suggest that this does not necessarily imply that financial reporting quality
will be adversely affected.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 is literature
review and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology.
Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 outlines the conclusions.
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2. Literature, Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Earnings management and private family ownership
There is debate in the family firm literature on whether private family firms incur
higher or lower agency costs compared to non-family private firms. The classic
agency problem of separation of ownership and control (i.e., Agency Problem Type I)
is argued to be less severe in family firms than among non-family firms (Ali et al.,
2007; Setia-Atmaja, Haman and Tanewski, 2011). Family firms have several
attributes that align incentives of managers to act in the best interest of shareholders
(Ali et al., 2007). Family firms have both concentrated and undiversified
shareholdings, which links their wealth to firm performance and subsequently
heightens their incentives to monitor managers (Andersen and Reeb, 2003). Family
firms also have long term and sustainable presence and their intention to preserve the
family name suggests they have a greater stake in the firm compared to non-family
firms (Wang, 2006). Accordingly, the alignment hypothesis argues that as the
incentives of owners and managers are better aligned, this reduces the motivation to
opportunistically manage earnings in family firms.
However, there is a strand of literature that argues family firms face more
severe agency problems because of conflicts arising between controlling and non-
controlling shareholders (i.e., Agency Problem Type II), resulting from expropriation
and/or entrenchment (Setia-Atmaja et al, 2011). Further, due to the absence of capital
market oversight, Schulze et al. (2001) highlight the potential agency costs that family
altruism brings to private family firms such as free riding by family members and
nepotism. The family's controlling interest in private firms provides them with greater
opportunities for private rent extraction for the benefit of family members, which
could be at the expense of minority shareholders (Schulze et al. 2001). For example,
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the families' reluctance to fire incompetent family members are likely to lead to
higher agency costs (Setia-Atmaja et a!., 2011). These arguments suggest that
financial reporting quality could be higher in non-family firms as family firms
manipulate earnings in order to hide expropriation of wealth from outside
shareholders. The rationale is that family ownership exacerbates agency problems
between controlling and minority shareholders as family firms potentially experience
greater information asymmetry between founding families and other shareholders
(Wang, 2006). Consistent with this reasoning, the entrenchment hypothesis argues
that family firms are less efficient because concentrated ownership creates incentives
for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth at the expense of other
shareholders.
Both types of agency problems create incentives to manage earnings (Ali et ai,
2007). Type I agency problems are arguably more severe among non-family firms as
these firms are more likely to tie compensation contracts of managers to accounting
numbers, creating incentives for earnings manipulation (Ali et a!. 2007). However,
due to the substantial and frequently exclusive ownership of private family firms,
private family firms are highly incentivized to monitor their firms and maximize
profitability (Carney et al. 2013). Moreover, as family owners are often more
knowledgeable about the firm's business activities, they are better able to mitigate
managerial expropriation more effectively through direct monitoring (Anderson and
Reeb, 2003). Indeed, in the private setting where managers are also owners, the
manager is more likely to be committed to seeking the interests of the family and will
have less incentives to manipulate earnings in order to meet short term performance
goals (Yang, 2010). Accordingly, from a lack of alignment perspective, private family
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firms will have fewer incentives to manage earnings compared to non-family private
firms.
The literature suggests that higher quality financial reporting observed among
family firms is consistent with the notion that families have a desire to preserve socio-
emotive wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011). Indeed socio-emotive wealth factors such
as good reputation and a positive family image will mitigate incentives to manage
earnings and thus outweigh reasons to manipulate earnings management.
Furthermore, as family and firm wealth are closely linked, Stockmans et al. (2010)
suggest that as expropriation of minority shareholders reduces family wealth,
entrenchment and expropriation problems (i.e., Agency Problem Type II) are less
dominant in private family firms and thus there will be fewer incentives to engage in
opportunistic behaviour.
Notwithstanding the above theoretical arguments, empirical research provides
inconclusive evidence on the impact family firms and concentrated ownership have
on financial reporting quality. Using S&P 500 firms, both Ali et al. (2007) and Wang
(2006) document family firms exhibit higher financial reporting quality compared to
non-family firms. Outside the US environment, Cascino et al. (2010) examined
earnings quality of Italian listed firms and found evidence that earnings quality of
family firms is higher relative to their non-family counterparts, while Prencipe, Bar-
Yosef, Mazzola and Pozza (2011) found that Italian family firms are less likely to
smooth income, which is consistent with the theoretical arguments that family firms
produce higher quality financial reports.
Beyond the capital market environment, Stockmans et al. (2010) used survey
data of Belgian private family firms that engage in upward earnings management and
found that founder family firms seem to have greater incentives to manage earnings
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upwards in order to preserve socio-ernotional wealth.i Meanwhile, Kvaal et al. (2012)
investigated earnings management behavior of private family and non-family firms in
Norway and found that private family firms are more likely to manage earnings
downwards compared to non-family firms. However, this was not the case with
highly leveraged private family firms, which were found to manage their earnings
upwards. Kvaal et al. (2012) argue that these results are consistent with the notion that
earnings management is used primarily as a tool to preserve family control.
Private family firms are usually characterised by substantial or exclusive
ownership, while public family firms are more likely to be characterised by mixed
ownership, in particular family block-holders, non-family block-holders, and other
types of significant investors, as well as minority investors. Mixed ownerships in
public family firms create incentives for public family firms to expropriate wealth
from minority shareholders, while this is attenuated in private family firms as
substantial ownership ties the family's wealth closely to the firms' wealth (Carney et
al. 2013). In comparison to public family firms, private family firms are arguably
more opaque as generally private firms need to disclose less information than public
firms. Further, private family firms benefit less from capital market oversight, which
suggests that private family firms are more exposed to altruism, loss aversion and
pursuit of non-economic goals. These differences suggest that public and private
family firms are distinct organization forms that have differing levels of agency
problems, resulting in differing incentives for earnings management. Although family
ownership enables better monitoring of managerial expropriation, it also provides
incentives and opportunities for private rent extraction. Notwithstanding, due to their
frequent substantial and exclusive ownership, private family firms have higher
2 As per Stockmans et al. (20 I0), socio-emotional .weal.th "=: .to the non-financial aspects of the
firm that meet the family 's ~lJective n~eds such as Identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and
the perpetuation of the family dynasty (p.280).
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incentives to maximize profitability (Carney et aI., 2013). Hence we argue that due to
close links between family and firm wealth in private firms, private firms have fewer
incentives to manage earnings opportunistically as it also reduces family wealth.
Thus, drawing on the aforementioned theory and empirical evidence, this
study predicts that in private family firms, incentives to produce high quality financial
reports will outweigh incentives to manage earnings and thus family firms will be
associated with higher financial reporting quality. As such, the following hypothesis
summarizes the above arguments:
Hi: Private family firms will be associated with higher financial reporting quality
compared to non-family private firms.
2.2 Voluntary disclosure and private family ownership
Voluntary disclosure is information provided by the firm in excess of information that
is mandatorily disclosed. It refers to the owner's decision to file abbreviated (i.e.,
financial reports with the option not to disclose turnover and cost of sales) rather than
full financial reports. Proprietary costs are incurred when competitors use private
information to their advantage that is obtained through voluntary disclosure. The
hypotheses related to voluntary disclosure are derived from proprietary cost theory
and are based on the literature that argues proprietary costs limit incentives to provide
voluntary disclosure (Verrechia, 1983).
Information regarding sales and cost of sales is relevant to competitors and
there are proprietary costs incurred in its disclosure (Dedman and Lennox 2009).
Specifically, information on sales and cost of sales is commercially sensitive,
particularly for profitable companies, as it enables competitors to copy the strategies
of more successful companies. For example, firms with lower costs will not want their
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competitors to be aware of how they achieved a much lower cost of production
(Dedman and Lennox 2009).
Notwithstanding, disclosure decisions are based on costs and benefits borne by
the firm. Benefits of disclosure often highlighted in the public firm setting include
reducing the cost of capital and improving liquidity (Francis, Khurana and Pereira,
2005). However, disclosure can also be costly as increased disclosure could result in a
loss of proprietary information (Scott, 1994; Prencipe, 2004). Thus, in deciding
whether to reveal voluntary information, firms face a trade-off between the benefits of
reducing information asymmetry to capital providers and the costs of aiding
competitors through revealing proprietary information. Proprietary cost theory argues
that when there are no disclosure related costs, firms voluntarily disclose information
in order to reduce information asymmetry (Verrechia, 1983). In particular, proprietary
cost theory suggests that disclosure levels decrease with higher proprietary costs
(Darrough and Stoughton, 1990).
Empirical research finds that a firm's ownership structure is associated with
differing levels of disclosure, suggesting optimal disclosure levels differ across firms
and that differing agency costs may provide some explanation for cross-sectional
variations in the firms' disclosure policy (Gelb, 2000). Similarly, both ownership and
competition are important in explaining the firm's voluntary disclosure behavior (Birt
et al. 2006). Meanwhile, German firms only provide segment information when
proprietary cost is low, that is, when entry barriers are relatively high (Leuz 2004).
Research on public firms' voluntary disclosure practises finds that family
firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, but they provide more
earnings warnings, and are less likely to make voluntary disclosures about their
corporate governance practices compared to non-family firms, suggesting that family
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owners tend to bear the cost of proprietary disclosures (Ali et al. (2007; Chen et al.
2008). Research also finds that listed companies with controlling family members on
the firm's board tend to have less transparent disclosures (Ho and Wong 2001). This
suggests family firms have less incentives to provide voluntary disclosures as family
members, who are both a substantial shareholder and a member of the board, will
have direct access to both financial and non-financial information.
As outlined above, most prior research on voluntary disclosure is based on
public rather than on private firms. This research also suggests that public family
firms have lower incentives to provide voluntary disclosure and that proprietary costs
among public firms are associated with a reduction in voluntary disclosures. Drawing
on this research we argue that private family firms are characterized by substantial or
exclusive ownership, suggesting they are likely to incur higher proprietary costs
compared to private non-family firms. Accordingly, we argue that voluntary
disclosure of information on sales and cost of sales is better explained by the firm's
ownership structure. By using disclosures of sales and cost of sales among private
firms as a proxy for voluntary disclosure, Hypothesis 2 predicts that family firms will
less likely be associated with voluntary disclosure.
H2: Family firms will less likely be associated with the voluntary disclosures of sales
and cost of sales compared to other types of private firm ownership structures.
The literature reports conflicting predictions on how earnings quality
influences firms' disclosure decisions (Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008). Information
asymmetry between firm insiders and shareholders creates demand for disclosure and
provides incentives for firms to disclose because the value of additional information is
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greater in these settings (Grossman and Hart 1980). In contrast, in his model of how
the quality of information available to managers explains subsequent voluntary
disclosure, Verrecchia (1990) argues that if information quality increases, managers
will have more incentives to disclose information. Accordingly, using this argument,
firms with better financial reporting quality will have more voluntary disclosure
(Francis et aI., 2008).
Further, evidence on the association between voluntary disclosure and
earnings quality is mixed and inconclusive. Lobo and Zhou (2001) provide evidence
that increased disclosure is associated with reduced earnings management, while
Francis et al. (2008) document a complementary association between earnings quality
and voluntary disclosure. Examining the relationship between high quality accounting
disclosures and financial reporting quality of 500 UK listed firms after IFRS adoption
between 2005 and 2009, Latridis (2011) finds firms that have higher levels of
disclosures engage in less earnings management and have greater levels of conditional
conservatism. In more recent research, Mouselli et al. (2012) find that firms with
higher quality financial reporting also have higher disclosure quality. In contrast,
Shaw (2003) finds firms with higher quality disclosures use discretionary accruals to
smooth earnings more aggressively than firms with lower quality disclosures,
suggesting that higher quality disclosure does not always indicate lower earnings
management.
As prior literature provides mixed and inconclusive evidence on the relationship
between earnings quality and disclosure decisions, and this relationship has not been
examined in the context of private family firms, we investigate private ownership structure
type on disclosure and its effect on earnings quality Thus, Hypothesis 3 summarises the
aforementioned arguments and predicts the following:
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H3: Family firms that are associated with voluntary disclosures of sales and cost of sales are
more likely to exhibit higher financial reporting quality compared to other private firms types
not associated with voluntary disclosures of sales and cost of sales.
3. Method
3.1 Sample selection
This paper utilizes panel data of medium-sized UK private companies for the period
2004-2011. Financial and ownership data were obtained from Bureau Van Dijk
(BVD) through their FAME database. This database has been used in prior research
on private companies such as Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Dedman and Lennox
(2009).
The sample comprises only privately held companies domiciled in the United
Kingdom and excludes the following companies: public limited companies, whether
listed or unlisted, inactive companies and wholly owned subsidiaries of public
companies; all companies from the financial services and energy and utilities
industries are excluded as these companies have unique disclosures, a high degree of
complexity and a unique accrual generating process; public administrative institutions
are also excluded (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008) as they have different
objectives in comparison to profit making entities. The sample selection process is
summarized in Table 1 and after following the selection criteria, 3,152 firms were left
in the sample.
Insert Table 1 here
The sample selection period of 2004-2011 includes changes introduced to the
size thresholds of private medium-sized firms in the UK in 2004, enabling some firms
that previously filed full accounts to be eligible during and after 2004 to file
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abbreviated financial reports (i.e., reports that do not disclose turnover and cost of
sales information). Accordingly, the period 2004-2007 provides a natural laboratory
setting to test proprietary costs among private medium sized firms in the UK. In
particular, to test the relation between family ownership and voluntary disclosure, we
use submission of abbreviated report by companies as the dependent variable (i.e.,
coded 1 if the firm files abbreviated financial reports and 0, otherwise). The non-
disclosure of turnover and cost of sales information in the abbreviated financial
reports proxy for proprietary costs (Dedman and Lennox, 2009).
3.2 Measures
3.2.1 Dependent Variables
Proxies for Financial Reporting Quality - This paper uses two measures of financial
reporting quality (Chen et aI., 2011). We test whether financial reporting quality, as
proxied by the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model and the modified Dechow-
Dichev (2002) measure, is a function of type of private firm ownership and a number
of private firm characteristics identified in the literature. The coefficient of interest is
Famdum (a family firm indicator variable), which examines the association between
family ownership and financial reporting quality. Hypothesis 1 is accepted ifthere is a
positive association between the family dummy and the proxies of financial reporting
quality. The basic form of the model is presented in equation (I) below:
FRQ it= 0.0 + 0.1Famdum., + a20wnershipit + a3Leverage it + a4Size it + a sROA it + 0.6
AbsROA it a 7GROWTH it +0. sAudit it + a9Loss it + alOAge it + allIndustryit +
Pl2Yearn + Sit
(1)
18
Two measures are used to proxy for financial reporting quality. The first is the
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals measure developed by Kothari, Leone
and Wasley (2005), which is estimated cross-sectionally using all firm-year
observations for each industrial sector that has at least 10 observations.
(2)
Where, TACCiI is total accruals of medium-sized company i in year {,(measured as the
change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current non-interest bearing
liabilities, minus depreciation); TAil is total assets; IlREViI is annual change in
revenue; PPEil is property, plant and equipment and ROAiI is net income divided by
total assets at the end of balance sheet date. The absolute value of the residuals in the
industry specific regression equation are used to proxy for the discretionary accrual
component. Further, the absolute value of the residual is multiplied by -1 as a proxy
for accrual quality (Hope et al. 2013) as it enables the construction of a metric that is
increasing in accounting quality, that is, higher values represent higher accrual
quality.
The second measure of accruals quality is the modified version of the cross-
sectional Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as shown in equation 3 below:
(3)
Where, WCAit is the working capital accruals of medium-sized firms i at year {,
measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current
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liabilities other than short term debt, scaled by lagged total assets; OCFit is cash flows
from operations at year t, measured as the sum of net income and depreciation minus
WCA, scaled by lagged total assets at year t; OCFit-J is operating cash flows at t-I,
scaled by lagged total assets at year t; OCFit+Jis operating cash flows at t+ 1, scaled by
lagged total assets at year t; DOCFit is an indicator variable, where one if the changes
in cash flow at t is less than zero (CFt - CFOt_J< 0), and zero otherwise and DOCFit *
OCFit is a proxy for economic losses.
Voluntary Disclosure (Proxy for Proprietary Costs) - Abbreviated financial reports
proxy for proprietary costs as sales and cost of sales are commercially sensitive
information (Dedman and Lennox, 2009). To test the relation between family
ownership and voluntary disclosure, the dependent variable is abbreviated report,
coded 1 if the firm files abbreviated financial reports and 0, otherwise. The variable of
interest is Famdum (a family firm indicator variable). Hypothesis 2 will be supported
ifFamdum is positively and significantly associated with abbreviated financial reports
as prior literature has provided evidence that family firms prefer less voluntary
disclosure (Chen et al, 2008). Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent
variable, a logistic regression model is utilised as per equation (4) below:
Ln [p/l-p] ABBREVi/ = uo+ uJFamdumi/ + u20wnershipi/ +u3HERFi/ + u4Sizei/ +
usLeveragei/ + U6Agei/+ n-Liquidity, +ugAssetTangibilitYil + iU9ABsROAi/ +
uJOLTDebtil+ iUJJLTDebtil +uJ2Growthi/ +uI3Auditi/ + iUJ4INDUSTRYi/+ci/ (4)
Where, ABBREVi/ is an indicator variable with a value of 1 when firm i did not
disclose sales and cost of sales t, 0 otherwise; Famdum., is a dummy variable taking
the for value of 1 if family firm; else 0; Ownership, is the proportion ownership of the
largest ultimate shareholder; HERFi/ is calculated as the sum of squares of market
20
shares in the industry; Size, is the natural logarithm of total assets; leverage, is total
debt divided by total asset; Age, is firm age in years; Liquidity it is current assets over
current liabilities; Assets tangibility, is plant, property and equipment divided by
total assets; ROAi/ is net income divided by total assets; LTfrebt., is Long Term debt
divided by total assets; is GROWTHit is current growth in assets for year t and
AUDITi/ is an indicator variable with a value of 1 when firm i hires a BIG 4 auditor
during year t, 0 otherwise.
3.2.2 Explanatory Variables - Family Ownership
Consistent with prior studies (Claessen et aI., 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer, 1999), this study focuses on ultimate family ownership. An ultimate owner is
defined as the shareholder who is not controlled by anyone else and is identified by
looking at the detailed ownership structure in the FAME database. Although a
company can have more than one ultimate owner, consistent with Fan and Wong
(2002), this paper focuses on the largest ultimate owner. We define family ownership
as those in which the family member are in the top management and is the largest
percentage shareholder. In particular, the definition of family companies utilized in
this study is an indicator variable, coded one when family members are either on the
board of directors or in the top management and is the largest percentage ultimate
shareholder(s) and, 0 otherwise. This measure of family firm captures both family
ownership and family control, which is consistent with other operational definitions
utilized in the literature to capture the family firm construct. Additionally, in
robustness test, an alternative definition of family firms is utilised. Specifically,
family firms are subdivided into family firms with shareholdings of more than 50 per
cent and shareholdings of less than 50 per cent of total shares.
21
3.2.3 Control Variables - Private Company Characteristics
We include several control variables that potentially affect discretionary accruals in
the regression models. We expect size, performance and age to be to be positively
associated with financial reporting quality. Larger firms are more visible and thus face
more demand for higher quality financial reporting. Dechow and Dichev (2002) show
that larger firms tend to have more stable and predictable operations. Prior research
shows that it is important to control for performance as firms with low (high) earnings
tend to have negative (positive) discretionary accruals (Kim and Vi, 2006). Moreover,
Kothari et al. (2005) argue tests related to financial reporting discretion that do not
control for performance are often misspecified. Consistent with prior literature, loss is
controlled for in the model because firms that have negative income are usually
associated with lower accounting quality (Wang, 2006). We expect loss to be
negatively associated with financial reporting quality.
We include several control variables that potentially affect voluntary disclosure
in the regression models in the logit regression models. The Herfindahl-Hirschman
index is used to proxy for competition and is calculated as the sum of squares of sales
in the industry (Dedman and Lennox, 2009). Higher values of the Herfindahl index
denote greater concentration of sales which is generally interpreted as indicating the
industry is less competitive. We expect that more intense competition will lead to
lower disclosure. Dedman and Lennox (2009) found evidence in their study of UK
private manufacturing companies that successful private companies are less likely to
lodge full financial reports if they are more profitable. Performance is predicted to be
positively associated with the filing of abbreviated financial reports as better
performing firms have lower incentives to withhold information.
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4. Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 Panel A presents the mean values for companies segregated by family and
non-family and the test statistics for mean differences on several dimensions. The
mean for both the Jones and the Dechow-Dichev accrual measures for family
companies are significantly larger compared to non-family companies (p < .01).
Higher values represent better financial reporting quality, providing early support for
HI, which predicts that family companies have better financial reporting quality than
non-family companies. Moreover, the mean ownership percentages of the largest
owner are 86 per cent for family and 72.3 per cent for non-family companies, which
suggests that family companies are more concentrated than non-family companies.
Family firms also appear to be smaller than non-family firms at the 1 per cent level
and on average have less debt than non-family firms. With respect to performance as
measured by ROA, results from the t-test suggest that family and non-family
companies in this sample do not differ with respect to performance.
Table 2 Panel B presents the mean values for firms segregated by abbreviated
and full financial statements and the test statistics for mean differences. The t-test
statistics show firms that lodge abbreviated and full financial statements have several
different company specific characteristics. With regards to the lodgement of full
financial reports, 52 per cent of the full financial reports lodged were by family
companies. Meanwhile, 75 per cent of family companies lodged abbreviated financial
reports. In addition, the t-test suggest companies that file abhreviated financial
statements have higher ownership concentrations. Turning to the measure used for
accruals quality, the mean value for the Dechow measure is significantly larger (at the
one per cent level) for firms that produce abbreviated financial statements. This
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provides early evidence suggesting that companies filing abbreviated financial
statements have higher financial reporting quality. Using ROA as a proxy for
profitability, evidence suggests that better performing firms provide minimal
disclosure. This is similar to the evidence documented by Dedman and Lennox (2009)
and is consistent with the argument that better performing companies have more to
lose by releasing commercially sensitive information such as sales and cost of sales.
Insert TabJe 2 here
4.2 Earnings management and private family ownership
Table 3 reports pooled regression results as specified In equation (1) using
discretionary accruals (Jones) and an accrual quality measures (Dechow and Dichev,
2002) as the dependent variable. The coefficient from the Dechow-Dichev model is
0.003 and is significant, suggesting that family companies are associated with higher
accruals quality. Consistent with the Dechow-Dichev model, the Jones model is also
positive and significant, and both models are significant at p<O.Ol. The adjusted R2 is
14.5 per cent or higher which is similar to other studies using earnings quality models
(Wang, 2006). Table 4 presents results using random effect regressions. Both models'
results remain qualitatively unchanged and show that family companies are positively
associated with better financial reporting quality, which suggests that family
companies have fewer incentives to manage earnings.
Insert TabJes 3 and 4 here
Although theory suggests that family firms face entrenchment and
expropriation problems, the evidence indicates that private family firms have fewer
incentives to manage earnings, providing support for HI. A possible explanation is
the close link between family and firm wealth, with private family companies having
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fewer incentives to manage earmngs opportunistically, as it reduces the family's
wealth (Stockmans et aI., 20 10). Furthermore, these results are consistent with the
conjecture that less severe agency problems result in less opportunistic earnings
managements and higher financial reporting quality (Ali et aI, 2007). The results also
lend support to the argument that family firms have longer time horizons, and are
willing to forgo short-term benefits from earnings management as it may affect the
long-term performance of the firm. Moreover, results are also consistent with the
view that family shareholders treat their ownership as an asset to pass on to their
heirs rather than wealth to consume during their lifetimes (Anderson and Reeb' ,
2003). Accordingly, private family firms have fewer incentives to manage earnings.
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Wang 2006) size is positive and
significantly related to earnings quality, suggesting that larger firms are associated
with higher financial reporting quality. In addition, leverage is negative and
significant in the Jones discretionary accrual model (see Tables 3 and 4). Thus,
although a major source of finance in privately held companies is banks (Vander
Bauhede and Willekens, 2004), this lends some support to the argument by Ball and
Shivakurnar (2005) that private companies are more likely to communicate with
lending banks privately and via establishing relationships. Moreover, as highlighted
by Dedman and Lennox (2009), banks do not need to rely on publicly available
financial statements as banks can obtain this information directly from companies
without the companies having to make the information publicly available.
4.3 Earnings management and voluntary disclosure
Table 5 presents the results of logit regressions examining a company's decisions to
file abbreviated financial statements. Both the family indicator variable and
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ownership concentration are positively and significantly associated with the
likelihood of filing of abbreviated financial statements.
Insert Table 5 here
A similar result is also documented by Ali et al. (2007) in the public firm
setting. Ali et al. (2007) found that despite family firms exhibiting better earnings
quality, family firms provided less transparent disclosures of their corporate
governance practices in their sample of public firms. This is consistent with the
conjecture that family and non-family firms have different preferences for voluntary
disclosure. As family firm's have more concentrated ownership, an undiversified
portfolio and better access to information (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), these family
companies place a lower preference for voluntary disclosure.
Another explanation for family companies showing lower preferences for
voluntary disclosure is they bear the proprietary costs of disclosing private
information such as providing competitors with commercially sensitive information,
which may result in a loss of profits (Chen et aI., 2008). Furthermore, it is not clear
that they stand to gain benefits from voluntary disclosure, as they are able to
communicate with their stakeholders privately. Accordingly, voluntary disclosure of
sales and cost of sales by family firms is a response to whether these items are viewed
as commercially sensitive information. Thus family firms that stand to lose more from
disclosing such commercially sensitive information are unlikely to lodge full financial
reports. In summary, results in Table 5 show consistently that family firms are
positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of filing of abbreviated
financial statements, supporting Hypothesis 2, which suggests that family firms have
fewer incentives to provide voluntary disclosures.
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With respect to the control variables, as predicted size is significantly and
negatively associated with the likelihood of filing abbreviated financial statements.
Age is also positively associated with the likelihood of filing abbreviated financial
reports and is consistent with the argument by Dedman and Lennox (2009) that one of
the reasons for their longevity is due to these companies' ability to hide the reason for
their competitive advantage. Performance as measured by return on assets is
positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of filing abbreviated
financial statements. This is consistent with Dedman and Lennox (2009) who found
evidence in their study of UK private manufacturing companies that successful
private companies are less likely to lodge full financial reports if they are more
profitable. This result supports the argument that highly profitable companies have
incentives to hide their success in order to prevent rivals from copying their success
(Dedman and Lennox, 2009).
Table 6 presents results of logit regressions examining the association between
the company's decision to file abbreviated financial statements and financial reporting
quality using the Dechow-Dichev measure as a proxy for financial reporting quality.
Table 6 (see Column 1) shows that the coefficient for the Dechow-Dichev measure is
not significant and the interaction term (as shown in Column 2) between family and
financial reporting quality is similarly not significant. The results show that regardless
of the firm's financial reporting quality, there is no significant difference as to
whether family companies submit an abbreviated or full financial report which
provides no support for Hypothesis 3.
Insert Table 6 here
A possible explanation could be that financial reporting quality and voluntary
disclosure have different economic roles in private family companies. It is argued that
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quality of financial reporting is important for stewardship as private companies do not
have market measures of firm value (Chaney et al. (2004). Notwithstanding, due to
their undiversified and concentrated nature, private family companies will have less to
gain from voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, family companies will bear all the
proprietary costs of disclosing proprietary information such as providing competitors
with commercially sensitive information which may lead to loss of profits.
Accordingly, voluntary disclosure of sales and cost of sales by family companies is a
response to whether sales and cost of sales is viewed as commercially sensitive
information, thus it is argued that family companies that stand to lose more will be
unlikely to be associated with the likelihood of lodging full financial reports.
Furthermore, it suggests that not disclosing potentially sensitive information is not
indicative of lower financial reporting quality.
4.1.3 Robustness Tests
Changes in Regulation (Companies Act 2006) - In 2008 there were changes made to
the Companies Act 2006 (Amendment), which increased the threshold for medium
companies in the UK. Even though a year indicator variable was included as a control
in regression models reported in Tables 2 and 3, this study includes separately a
regulation indicator variable to assess if there are any changes in the regression
results. The interaction between family and the regulation change dummy is not
significant, suggesting that the change in regulation did not affect family firm
financial reporting behavior (due to limited space, robustness test tables are not
reported in this paper but are available on request). The ownership concentration and
regulation indicator is only marginally significant for the Dechow-Dichev (2002)
model at the 10 per cent level. This provides some evidence that firms with higher
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ownership concentrations improved their financial reporting quality after the change
in regulation in 2008.
Alternative Measures of Family Owned Companies - Although there is broad
agreement that family exercises a large influence over the family firms, numerous and
differing operational definitions are utilized in order to capture the family firm
construct. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) argue that often the operational threshold
utilized to capture family firms is too low outside the realm of the largest publicly
traded American firms. In the regressions reported earlier, the family dummy
variable captures family control and ownership, but it does not specify a cut off for
the level of ultimate family ownership. In order to capture whether level of ownership
matters, family is divided into separate categories of ownership of 50 per cent and
over and ownership of less than 50 per cent. In both categorizations, family members
are in top management. Random effects regression results show that family has only a
positive effect on earnings quality when ownership is greater than 50 per cent. This
suggests that where family owners have significant influence and control over
management, they are able to effectively mitigate managerial expropriation in line
with the alignment effect.
Performance and Endogeneity - An issue highlighted in the literature on
ownership is the potential endogeneity problem that exists between ownership and
performance. In particular, Hutton (2007) maintains that if families only retain
ownership and control of successful firms, then the relationship between financial
reporting quality and family firms is spurious. As previously outlined, following Kim
and Yi (2006), two measures of performance have been included in order to control
for the effect that performance may have on financial reporting quality. Additionally,
a robustness check is carried out to address the potential endogeneity problem
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between performance and earnings quality by utilizing a dynamic panel model using
the generalized method of moments (GMM) system estimator. GMM results' show
that family remains positively and significantly associated with all the earnings
quality proxies, suggesting that the relationship between family and earnings quality
is not spurious due to endogeneity problems. However, ownership concentration is
not significant in all the models, suggesting that it is family control and not ownership
concentration that is associated with better financial reporting quality.
5. Discussions and Conclusions
This paper is designed to further our understanding of financial reporting behaviour of
private medium-sized companies in the UK. Specifically this paper examines whether
variation in the type of ownership, that is family versus non-family, influences
financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosure behaviour of private medium-
sized companies. Using both the Dechow-Dichev (2002) measure of accrual quality
and the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model, results reveal that family
ownership is associated with higher financial reporting quality. Evidence from this
paper corroborates the findings of research in the public setting and suggests that even
in the private firm setting, where there is arguably less capital market pressure to
produce high quality financial reports, family companies are associated with higher
quality financial reports (Wang, 2006; Ali et al. 2007).
Notwithstanding, logit regressions suggest that family companies are
significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of lodging abbreviated
financial reports. The result is consistent with the notion that family companies have
less incentives to provide voluntary disclosure as they incur more costs in terms of
3 Due to space constraints, GMM results are not reported in a Table in this version of the paper but are
available on demand.
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loss of proprietary information, but due to their substantial ownership and
involvement in management they derive less benefit from voluntary disclosures. The
results corroborate evidence from Chen et al. (2008), who document that family
owners in the public company setting prefer less voluntary disclosure.
Overall this paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it
provides recent evidence on the positive effect of private family ownership on
financial reporting quality. Despite the prevalence and economic importance of
private companies, research on private companies, particularly the effect of variations
in ownership in the private company setting is very limited. Second, this paper takes
advantage of an ideal setting to test the proprietary cost hypothesis and fills an
important gap in the literature by providing insights into the impact of private family
ownership on voluntary disclosure. Third, a practical contribution is that it presents
recent evidence to provide a better understanding of private companies' financial
statements to both users and policy makers. In particular, private financial statement
users should incorporate ownership in their evaluations of private statement financial
statements as unique characteristics of private family companies have different
implications on their financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosure behavior.
For policy makers, in light of the lower level of disclosures in IFRS for SMEs, an
implication is that findings suggest lower disclosures do not necessarily imply that
financial reporting quality will be adversely affected.
A limitation of this study is that while two earnings quality measures were
utilized to triangulate the results, nonetheless as highlighted by Hope et al. (2013), the
literature has provided many variations of these models. Accordingly, similar to Hope
et al. (2013), using alternative models may affect the outcomes of conclusions in this
thesis. Furthermore, care must be taken not to generalize the findings beyond
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medium-sized private UK companies. In particular, conclusions in this thesis may not
apply to US private companies as in the US; private company's information
environment is more opaque as financial reports are not widely distributed to the
public.
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Table1: Sample Selection
Number of Companies
Population of private compames available III the 7,755,657
FAME database in December 2012
Less Inactive Companies (5,065,130)
Less Companies not meeting the medium-sized
(2,604,531 )
company criteria
Less Utilities, Financial and Insurance, and Public (9,953)
Administrative Institutions
Less subsidiaries
(72,891)
Sample for analysis 3,152
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Table 2 Panel A:Mean Comparisons of Family and Non-Family Companies
by Financial Reporting Quality and Firm Characteristics
Measure Family Non-Family t-test
Company Company
Jones -0.079 -0.109 -14.916***
Dechow-Dichev -0.043 -0.062 -16.988***
Ownership 0.860 0.723 -38.22***
ROA 0.034 0.033 -0.928
AbsROA 0.056 0.082 22.624***
Size 11,547 16,022 10.263***
Leverage 0.281 0.334 12.778***
Growth 0.057 0.072 4.238***
Age 30.5 25.27 -14.347***
LOSSf 0.175 0.242 11.571 ***
Auditt 0.077 0.290 41.27***
"b Abb d d F II F" ntsPanel B:Mean ComparIsons )y revtate an u mancia Stateme
Measure Full Abbreviated t-test Mann-
Whitney test
Family Dummy] 0.52 0.75 -19.88*** -19.40***
Ownership 0.77 0.84 -9.09*** -7.606***
Herfindahl Index 0.000016 0.000015 0.50 9.673***
Dechow" -0.06 -0.04 -7.08*** -6.078***
LnSize 9.20 8.94 18.79*** 18.34***
Leverage 0.33 0.289 6.07*** 4.482***
Age 26.23 31.09 -9.41*** -13.12***
Liquidity 1.66 1.91 -6.92*** -7.545***
Asset Tangibility 0.37 0.43 -8.49*** -9.31 ***
ROA 0.04 0.04 -3.32*** -2.857***
Long Term Debt 0.25 0.24 1.06 -0.11
Growth 0.11 0.08 5.67*** 1.92**
Audit] 0.28 0.05 24.35*** 23.62***
Discretionary Accruals IS abnormal accruals using Jones (1991); Dechow IS earnings quality proxy
using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Disclosure Indicator is an indicator variable, where I is
lodging an abbreviated profit and loss account (i.e.. does not disclose sales and cost of sales) and 0 whenfirmsfile
full financialreports; Family Dummy is an indicator variable, where I is when family members is the
largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top
management and, 0 otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate
shareholder; ROA is net income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; Size is
natural log of total assets; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; growth is growth rate in assets;
Age is firm age in years; Loss is an indicator variable, I if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the
year, 0 otherwise; Audit is an indicator variable, I if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Asset
tangibility is fixed assets divided by total assets; ROA is net income divided by total assets; Long term Debt is
long-term debt over total liabilities, Growth is growth rates in assets; Herfindahl Index is concentration in the
firm's industry; t This indicates proportion of firms, rather than the mean proportion of associated
variables.
"Given that companies that lodge abbreviated financial reports do not disclose a value for turnover
(sales), the Jones discretionary accruals was not utilized as a proxy for financial reporting quality as it
requires the value of turnover to be used in the measure.
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Table 3: Pooled Regression Results on Earnings Quality and Family
Ownership
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Dechow- Dichev Jones
famdum 0.003*** 0.009***
(3.05) (3.80)
ownership -0.004* -0.003
(-1.93) (-0.81)
ROA 0.071 *** -0.003
(4.81) (-0.11)
AbsROA -0.425*** -0.196***
(-29.79) (-9.07)
Lnsize 0.002* 0.005**
(1.84) (2.56)
Leverage -0.004 -0.013**
(-1.24) (-2.21 )
Growth -0.045*** -0.1 06***
(-10.95) (-11.56)
Age 0.000* 0.000**
(1.73) (2.11 )
Loss -0.014*** -0.009***
(-8.53) (-2.69)
Audit -0.004** -0.005
(-2.10) (-1.61)
Constant -0.017* -0.069***
(-1.69) (-3.73)
Industry and Year Yes Yes
Observations 7,191 8,156
R2 0.422 0.148
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.145
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
famdum is an indicator variable, where I is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate
shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise;
Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; ROA is net income divided
by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; LnSize is natural log of total asset; Leverage is
total debt divided by total assets; Growth is growth rate in assets; Age is firm age in years; Loss is an
indicator variable, I if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Audit is an indicator
variable, I if the firm has a Big 4 aud itor, 0 otherwise; Year consists of 7 dummy variables; Industry
consists of 12 dummy variable.
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Table 4: Random Effects (RE) Regression Results on Earnings Quality and
Family Ownership
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Dechow-Dichev Jones
famdum 0.004*** 0.009***
(3.04) (3.28)
ownership -0.005* -0.004
(-1.76) (-0.78)
ROA 0.068*** -0.003
(3.91) (-0.14)
AbsROA -0.424*** -0.173***
(-26.36) (-7.95)
LnSize 0.002* 0.007***
(1.69) (2.93)
Leverage -0.005 -0.016**
(-1.37) (-2.23)
Growth -0.043*** -0.100***
(-11.51) (-11.55)
Age 0.000 0.000**
(1.24) (2.21 )
Loss -0.014*** -0.008**
(-7.54) (-2.41)
Audit -0.004* -0.007*
(-1.81) (-1.84)
Constant -0.015 -0.087***
(-1.32) (-3.97)
Industry and Year Yes Yes
Observations 7,191 8,156
Number ofID 1,925 2,035
R2 0.4222 0.1470
Adjusted R2 0.4199 0.1440
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<O.01, ** p<O.05, * p<O.1
famdum is an indicator variable, where I is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate
shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise;
Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; ROA is net income divided
by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; LnSize is natural log of total asset; Leverage is
total debt divided by total assets; Growth is growth rate in assets; Age is firm age in years; Loss is an
indicator variable, I if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Audit is an indicator
variable, I if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Year consists of 7 dummy variables; Industry
consists of 12 dummy variables
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Table 5: Probit Regression Results on Abbreviated Financial Statements
and Determinants of Disclosure
VARIABLES Abbreviated Financial Statements
famdum 1.146***
(5.23)
1.953***
(4.87)
-859.277
(-1.02)
-1.603***
(-8.53)
0.883*
(1.67)
0.016***
(3.08)
0.204**
(2.25)
1.371***
(2.73)
1.813*
(1.88)
-0.529
(-0.86)
0.145
(0.63)
-2.861 ***
(-5.77)
8.199***
(5.02)
ownership
Herfindahl Index
Size
Leverage
Age
Liquidity
Asset tangibility
ROA
LTdebt
Growth
Audit
Constant
Observations
Number ofID
Pseudo R2
5,123
2,047
0.1357
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<O.OI, ** p<O.05, * p<O.1
Disclosure Ind is an indicator variable. coded I when firms file abbreviated profit and loss accounts (i.e., does not
disclose sales and cost of sales) and coded 0 when firms file full financial reports; famdum is an indicator variable
coded I is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of
directors or in the top management and. 0 otherwise; ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate
shareholder; Herfindahllndex is Hertindahllndex of Concentration; Size is natural log of total assets; Leverage is
total debt divided by total assets: Age is number of years since incorporation; Liquidity is current assets over
current liability; Asset tangibility is fixed assets divided by total assets; Gross protit is gross profit divided by total
asset; ROA is net income divided by total assets: LT Debt is long term debt divided by total liabilities; Growth is
growth rate in assets; Audit is an indicator variable. I if the firm has a Big 4 auditor. 0 otherwise
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Table 6: Logit Regression Results on Abbreviated Financial Statements,
Family and Financial Reeorting Quality
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Abbreviated Financial Statements
famdum 1.426*** 1.293***
(4.26) (3.37)
ownership 2.458*** 1.701**
(4.00) (2.34)
famdum*Dechow -3.276
(-0.81)
Ownership*Dechow -16.905*
(-1.90)
Dechow- Dichev 0.845 16.949**
(0.42) (2.14)
Herfindahl Index -2,259.530** -2,234.572**
(-2.05) (-2.03)
Size -2.837*** -2.841 ***
(-6.81) (-6.75)
Leverage 0.364 0.445
(0.42) (0.51)
Age 0.016** 0.016**
(2.20) (2.14)
Liquidity 0.665*** 0.682***
(3.22) (3.47)
Asset Tangibility 2.703*** 2.652***
(3.25) (3.21 )
ROA 1.876 1.906
(1.16) (1.14)
LTdebt -0.806 -0.846
(-0.78) (-0.82)
Growth 0.872* 0.800*
(1.95) (1.77)
Audit -3.634*** -3.622***
(-5.07) (-5.22)
Constant 18.252*** 18.977***
(5.18) (5.28)
Observations 2,887 2,887
Number of 10 1,613 1,613
Pseudo R2 0.2238 0.2269
Robust z-staristics in parentheses
*** p<O.O I, ** p<O.05, * p<O.1
Disclosure Ind is an indicator variable, coded I when firms tile abbreviated profit and loss accounts (i.e. does not
disclose sales and cost of sales) and coded 0 when firms file full financial reports; famdum is an indicator variable
coded I when family members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of
directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate
shareholder; Herfindahl Index is Herfindahl Index of Concentration; Dechow-Dichev is earnings quality proxy
using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Size is natural log of total assets; Leverage is total debt divided by
total assets; Age is number of years since incorporation; Liquidity is current assets over current liability; Asset in
place is fixed assets over total assets; Gross profit is gross profit divided by total asset; ROA is net income divided
by total assets; LT Debt is long term debt divided by total liabilities; Growth is growth rate in assets; Audit is an
indicator variable, I if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise
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Appendix A: Variables for Financial Reporting Quality and Discretionary
Accruals Models
Variable Exp.Sign Definition
Dependent:
Jones Discretionary accruals using Jones(1991)
Dechow- Dichev Earnings quality proxy using modified
Dechow-Dichev(l992) model
Explanatory: + Indicator variable, where 1 IS when
Famdum family members are the largest
percentage ultimate shareholder(s) and
are either on the board of directors or in
the top management and, 0 otherwise
Ownership + Ownership is the proportion ownership of
the largest ultimate shareholder
Size + Natural log of total assets
Leverage +/- Total debt divided by total assets
ROA + Net income divided by total assets at the
end of balance sheet date
AbsROA Absolute value ofROA
Growth - Growth rate in assets
Age + Firm age in years
Loss - Indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting
net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise
Audit + Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the
firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise
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Appendix B: Variables for Voluntary Disclosure
Variable Exp.Sign Definition
Dependent: Indicator variable with a value of 1 when
ABBREVi/ company i discloses abbreviated financial
reports t, 0 otherwise
Explanatory: + A dummy variable taking the value 1 if
Famdum family firm; else 0
Ownership + Ownership is the proportion ownership of
the largest ultimate shareholder
HERF + The Herfindahl- Hirschman Index IS
calculated as the sum of squares of
market shares in the industry
Size - Natural logarithm of total assets
Leverage - Leverage is total debt divided by total
assets
Age - Age is firm age in years
Liquidity - Current assets over current liabilities
Assets Tangibility - Plant, property and equipment divided by
total assets
ROA + Net income divided by total assets at the
end of balance sheet date
Long term Debt - Long term Debt is long-term debt over
total liabilities
GROWTH - Current growth in assets for year t
AUDIT - Indicator variable with a value of 1 when
firm i hires a BIG 4 auditor during year t,
o otherwise
Dechow - Residuals from the modified Dechow-
Dichev( 1992) model
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